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This research mainly comprises two empirical 
studies. First, in an econometric analysis using 
statewide city-level data in Indiana, the first-difference 
model developed by Heckman and Hotz is applied to 
estimate the effect of property tax abatements (PTAs) 
over different sectors. The results indicate that a large 
majority of jobs created by the property tax abatement 
programs occur in the service sector, not the 
manufacturing sector. Despite the significant amount 
of attention focused on the manufacturing sector in 
discussions surrounding the implementation of 
property tax abatement programs, the analysis 
demonstrates that there is no significant contribution to 
employment in this sector. 
A balance between the output effect and the 
substitution effect may explain the variation in the 
economic effect ofPTAs across different sectors. Even 
though the output effect of the PTA programs increases 
demand for labor in the community, a decrease in the 
cost of capital induces substitution of capital for the 
relatively more expensive labor. Overall, the net 
impact of PTAs on the employment of each sector 
hinges on the balance between the output effect and the 
substitution effect. 
In addition, by applying the dummy variable 
technique, the analysis finds that the economic effect of 
PTAs diminishes over time. This finding confirms 
with the copycat behavior hypothesis proposed by 
previous scholars. Furthermore, the empirical results 
suggest that property tax abatements should be used 
only in the needy areas to maintain the long-term 
success of this program. 
Subsequently, in the Indianapolis case study, the 
empirical evidence suggests that regulating the use of 
property tax abatement programs is effective in keeping 
companies and jobs in the underprivileged 
communities. While this program has been effective in 
general, there are some concerns raised in the analysis. 
First, most applicants are current local companies, 
some of which repeatedly make use of the same 
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existing jobs as a threat in their pursuit for tax breaks. 
Furthermore, even though needy center cities have 
dominated the use of property tax abatements in the 
early years of its adoption, their comparative advantage 
obtained through this program seems to diminish over 
the long run. 
SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION 
The first two research questions of this analysis are 
concerned with the inter-jurisdictional economic effect 
of property tax abatements. While scholars have 
estimated the effectiveness of PTAs in general, very 
few have considered the potential variation in their 
effects over different sectors. Without understanding 
how PTAs influence different types of business, the 
granting decision of the tax relief can be inefficient. 
Therefore, the first research question of this analysis 
examines how the effectiveness of property tax 
abatement programs varies in attracting economic 
activities for different sectors. By applying a first-
difference model on the statewide city-level sample 
collected from Indiana, this analysis improves the 
methodology used by other researchers and measures 
the cross-sector economic effect ofPTAs within a 
geographic area not inspected before. 
F or a couple of reasons, it is argued that property tax 
abatements are typically used to attract investment 
from the manufacturing industry. First, the products of 
manufacturing firms are usually transported to the 
national market. Thus, manufacturers do not rely 
heavily on local market and are more willing to move 
to pursue the best tax incentive offers. In addition, 
because property tax abatements reward capital 
investments, they are more lucrative for capital-
intensive firms like those in the manufacturing sector. 
While the manufacturing sector has attracted the 
most attention, this analysis demonstrates that there is 
no significant employment contribution to this sector 
through the operation of property tax abatement 
programs. Instead, it is found that a great majority of 
jobs created by the property tax abatement program 
come from the service industry. Likewise, this tax 
incentive program has also contributed significantly to 
the local labor demand of the retail and wholesale trade 
sectors. 
A balance between the output effect and the 
substitution effect may explain the variation in the 
economic effect ofPTAs across different sectors. On 
one hand, property tax abatements reduce the cost of 
capital, increasing the net rate of return on capital in the 
PTA-adopting community. A higher rate ofretum on 
capital induces capital to move into the PTA-adopting 
jurisdiction. As a result, the increased supply of capital 
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increases demand for labor and land in the community, 
which is the output effect. 
On the other hand, property tax abatements reduce 
the cost of capital relative to the cost oflabor because 
labor is an unsubsidized factor in production. The 
change in the relative factor prices induces the change 
in capitaVlabor ratio. A decrease in the cost of capital 
to firms in the PTA-adopting community induces 
substitution of capital for relatively more expensive 
labor, and the demand for labor will be reduced at each 
level of output. Overall, the net impact ofPTAs on the 
employment of each sector hinges on the balance 
between the output effect and the substitution effect. 
In the output effect, the capital/labor ratio in the 
production function determines how many jobs will be 
created for a certain amount of property tax levies 
forgone. In this regard, offering property tax 
abatements to the capital-intensive manufacturing firms 
may not be very cost-effective in terms of job creation 
due to a high capitaVlabor ratio. In addition, it is also 
doubtful how many new jobs will be created when 
manufacturing companies upgrade their production 
equipment and facilities after the establishment of a 
new business. In Indiana, a great number of property 
tax abatements are offered to existing companies for 
the purchase of manufacturing equipment. 
As for the substitution effect, how seriously this 
effect will negatively impact labor demand depends on 
how easily companies can adjust their production 
function to take advantage of this tax relief. In other 
words, how practical is it for them to increase the 
capital/labor ratio in the production process when the 
relative price changes? In this regard, it is the 
manufacturing sector that can better adjust this ratio. 
Thus, labor in the manufacturing sector is more likely 
to be hurt by the substitution effect. 
In summary, for the positive output effect, offering 
of property tax abatements to the manufacturing sector 
is not very cost-effective in terms of job creation due to 
its high capitaVlabor ratio. Moreover, for the negative 
substitution effect, labor in the manufacturing 
companies can be affected more seriously because it is 
easier for manufacturers to alter the factors ratio in their 
production functions. A combination of these two 
reasons may explain why this analysis finds significant 
effects ofPTAs on the job growth of the service and 
other sectors, but not on that of the manufacturing 
sector. 
The second research question of this analysis is 
concerned with the structural change in the economic 
effect of property tax abatements over time. In 
contrast, the theme of the third research question is an 
investigation of this effect for jurisdictions with 
different economic conditions. Seemingly, these two 
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research questions are independent to each other. In 
reality, they are closely related. 
Prior research has found that in the years 
immediately following the adoption of the property tax 
abatement program by state legislation, cities under 
economic and fiscal stress are more likely to provide 
PTAs to alleviate their economic problems. Scholars 
argued convincingly that if this program works 
effectively in disadvantaged areas, it would boost the 
welfare for both the PTA-adopting municipalities and 
the whole region. 
Unfortunately, due to copycat behavior, researchers 
found that more and more jurisdictions tend to adopt 
similar local economic development policies over time. 
As a result, the comparative advantage created for the 
poor areas through tax incentives diminishes in the long 
run. 
Through use of the dummy variable technique, this 
analysis finds that there is a diminution in the 
effectiveness of the property tax abatement programs 
over time. The regression results show that when the 
deduction of the local property tax base grew by one 
percent in the 1980s, total employment increased by 
820. Nonetheless, total employment grew only by 156 
jobs in 1992 for the same amount of property tax base 
deducted. 
In 1982, 26 of the 53 Indiana cities used in this 
analysis provided property tax abatements. In 1995, 
50 of them were PTA-offering municipalities. As the 
number of PTA -adopting jurisdictions keeps growing 
and its stimulating effect continues to decrease, it is 
plausible that in the near future property tax abate-
ments, instead of being a selective tax incentive, may 
become a universal tax reward with no real impact. 
The third research question examines whether the 
regulation of property tax abatement programs can 
effectively boost the economy of center cities. To deal 
with the copycat behavior problem, prevent the 
effectiveness of tax incentives from declining, help 
poor areas, and increase regional welfare, scholars have 
proposed regulation of the use oftax incentives in only 
the economically distressed areas. While they have 
provided convincing theoretical arguments for this 
proposition, there is no empirical evidence to support 
its validity. Investigation of the third research question 
through an Indianapolis case study puts this policy 
recommendation into testing. 
Though Indianapolis does not limit the provision of 
property tax abatements in any specific area, it has 
adopted other regulations to aid in the relocation of 
low-paying jobs to Center Township and other poor 
townships. Companies with an average wage rate 
lower than $12.10 per hour must locate in Center 
Township to be eligible for property tax abatements. 
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In addition, with Metropolitan Development 
Commission as the sole designating body, it is assured 
that companies cannot manipulate different townships 
to pursue better tax incentive package. Through a logit 
study, this study also finds that the Commission has 
used its discretion to provide more generous property 
tax abatements to companies who are willing to locate 
in Center Township. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the 
Indianapolis property tax abatement program was 
effective in stimulating the local economy and in 
keeping companies and jobs in the underprivileged 
communities, especially in Center Township. Billions 
of dollars in real and personal property have been 
invested, and tens of thousands of jobs have been 
affected by the tax abatement recipients in Indianapolis 
over the last seven years. A great proportion of these 
jobs and capital investments were located in Center 
Township. 
While this program has been effective in general, 
there are some concerns raised in the analysis. By 
comparing the number of new and retained jobs 
contributed by the Indianapolis program, it is clear that 
most applicants were current local companies. 
Furthermore, existing jobs have been used and reused 
as a tool in the pursuit for tax breaks. City officials 
may want to revise this program so that it can be more 
successful in attracting new companies and generating 
new employment positions. 
Though Center Township has dominated in the use 
of property tax abatements, especially for real property, 
its use of this program has started to decrease since the 
early 1990s. Previous research suggested that the 
copycat behavior of wealthier jurisdictions could 
explain why center cities would lose their relative 
dominance in the use of tax incentives over the long 
run. This theory, however, cannot account for the 
intriguing trend in Center Township because there is 
only one designating body for the nine townships in 
Indianapolis. With Metropolitan Development 
Commission as the sole designating body, it is not 
feasible for the copycat behavior to occur in this region. 
For the continued success of this program, it is 
important for future studies to examine this 
phenomenon. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section proposes a number of policy 
recommendations based on the empirical findings. 
First, local development officials are advised to be 
more specific in shaping their policy objectives. Even 
thoughjob creation is the number one concern for local 
economic development agencies, most of the 
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development policies provide subsidies to capital, not 
labor. Scholars have warned about this disparity 
between means and goal. This analysis confirms that 
property tax abatements as subsidies to capital 
investment are not effective in promoting job growth in 
the manufacturing sector. 
While subsidies to capital might indirectly 
contribute to the expansion of local employment, they 
may not be the most effective method. If job creation 
in the manufacturing sector is the main goal, local 
government may do better by subsidizing labor 
directly. 
Second, due to the substitution effect triggered by 
the reduced capital price, even if companies invest in 
more capital as a result of the property tax abatement 
program, the net effect on local labor demand may not 
be positive. Municipalities should devote more effort 
to following up on the actual economic contributions of 
individual PTA-receiving firms. Ifpromises made in 
the statements of benefits are broken, governments 
should take action and terminate the tax breaks. 
Third, it is recommended that local govemments be 
more selective in the provision of property tax 
abatements. Studies like this analysis can provide more 
information with regard to the economic effect ofPTAs 
on different sectors. With this knowledge, government 
officials have a better chance of making more informed 
decisions. Furthermore, property tax abatement 
programs can be used together with other 
entrepreneurial demand-side policies. For instance, if 
development agencies find that their community has a 
comparative advantage over a specific sector, or that 
there are some regional or national markets worth 
exploiting, generous tax incentives can be provided to 
promote the targeted industries. Not only can more 
jobs be created, but the mixture of the whole local 
economy can be reshaped in a more favorable fashion. 
Finally, findings of this analysis support regulation 
of the use of property tax abatements. This restriction 
can be applied either in state legislation or by city 
councils. Without any limitations, all cities can use 
them on all sectors, and empirical evidence suggests 
that this is precisely what will occur in the long run. 
Furthermore, due to this widespread use, the economic 
effect of property tax abatements tends to diminish over 
time if no restrictions are applied. When all 
jurisdictions provide property tax abatements to most 
of the firms, it works very much like a statewide 
property tax rate cut. In such a case, poor communities 
cannot effectively revitalize their economies through 
this program. Finally, the findings of this analysis 
reveal that the operation of this program is a waste of 
administrative costs that results in no significant 
impact. 
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